Can electoral inequalities be legally justified? by Bouhon, Frédéric
ERPL/REDP, vol. 28, no 3, autumn/automne 2016 
CAN ELECTORAL INEQUALITIES  
BE LEGALLY JUSTIFIED?  
ANALYSIS OF BELGIAN, BRITISH AND GERMAN LAW 
THROUGH THE  
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE LAW* 
FRÉDÉRIC BOUHON** 
“By equality of suffrage, is meant equality of effect and value,  
as between the suffrage of one man and the suffrage of another.” 
Jeremy BENTHAM1 
 
THE election is an instrument which enables a community to choose 
one or several persons whom it entrusts with a political mandate. 
                                                             
* This article is based on a thesis prepared under the direction of Pr. Chr. 
Behrendt, which was presented on the 27th of March 2014 for a PhD de-
gree at the University of Liège (Belgium) and later received an award from 
the European Group of Public Law (Thesis Prize 2015) for which the au-
thor would like to offer sincere thanks. The original work was published in 
French (Droit électoral et principe d’égalité. L’élection des assemblées lé-
gislatives nationales en droits allemand, belge et britannique, Brussels, 
Bruylant, 2014, 1009 pages). A summarising article written in French 
about this study can be found in: Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 
(R.I.D.C.), 2015, 439-458. 
** Doctor of Laws and lecturer (chargé de cours) at the University of 
Liège. The author can be contacted at the following email address: 
f.bouhon@ulg.ac.be 
1 J. BENTHAM, Radical Reform Bill, [1819], in: J. BOWRING (dir.), The 
work of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3, Edinburgh, William Tait, 1843, Prelimi-
nary explanations.  
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When used at the scale of a democratic state, the election aims at 
reducing millions of different personal wills into a unique decision2.  
This reduction is one of the main aims of the election: a workable 
number of representatives can be selected while taking into account 
the wills of the governed people. Even if, theoretically, democracy 
does not necessarily imply the organisation of elections - on the 
contrary, the pure ideal of democracy requires the direct exercise of 
political power by the people -, there is no contemporary democ-
ratic state without elected political bodies3. In the current circum-
stances it would therefore be fair to assert, “elections are a neces-
sary precondition for democracy”4. 
Whilst a key instrument of every democratic state, the election is 
also the cause of difficulties. Significantly, the extent of each voter’s 
influence can be mitigated by the presence of other voters with dif-
fering views. This means that, for every election, there is a share of 
influence, and this in turn could be more or less equal. The manner 
in which electoral influence is distributed between the governed 
people depends mainly on the content of election law. 
Through a comparative legal research, based on Belgian, British 
and German law as well as on a comprehensive definition of elec-
tion law, it has been possible to evaluate the trends of this distribu-
tion of power. As it will be shown in this contribution, it appears 
that some legal rules tend to distribute the faculty to influence the 
composition of the elected assemblies equally among the governed 
people, while others tend to distribute it unequally. The primary 
goal of the study is therefore to examine if the identified inequali-
                                                             
2 See G. SARTORI, Théorie de la démocratie, Paris, Armand Colin, 1973, 
13. 
3 Several scholars think that the establishment of a direct democracy is 
simply impossible (see G. SARTORI, op. cit., 22, 57, 203; A. LIJPHART, 
Electoral systems and party systems, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1994 [reprinted: 2000], 1; D. NOHLEN, Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem, 
6th edition, Leverkusen, Budrich, 2009, 28; T. SHAW, Max Weber on De-
mocracy: can the people have political power in modern states?, Constel-
lations, 2008, 33-45). 
4 C. MORRIS, Parliamentary elections, representation and the law, 
Oxford and Portland, Hart, 2012, 1. 
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ties are legally justified or are undemocratic tools that merely help 
existing rulers stay in power. This analysis is based on a thorough 
examination of the case law of the highest Belgian, British and Ger-
man courts and of the European Court of Human Rights. 
This article aims at presenting some of the results of this study. It 
is divided into five sections: in the first, we will describe in detail 
the framework of the analysis (I); in the second, we will discuss the 
key concepts of the work, i.e. the notions of equality and of distri-
bution of electoral influence (II); the following two sections will 
deal with rules that tend towards equal and unequal distribution of 
electoral influence (III and IV respectively); and finally, the ques-
tion of whether electoral inequalities can be legally justified will be 
addressed (V). 
I. FRAMEWORK OF THE COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY 
The research presented in this article concerns election law and 
the equality principle in three European legal systems, i.e. the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Belgium and the United 
Kingdom.  
The choice of these particular countries is motivated firstly by 
their common features. All three are members of the Council of 
Europe and in this role have ratified the First Protocol to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, of which Article 3 is important 
in the field of election law5. Another common characteristic is that 
they all have parliamentary systems, with the formation of the gov-
ernment depending on the composition of one of the Houses of the 
parliament: the Bundestag in Germany, the House of Representa-
tives (Chambre des représentants) in Belgium and the House of 
Commons in the United Kingdom. The law which rules the elec-
tions of these assemblies constitutes the principal material of the re-
search6.  
                                                             
5 See below in this section. 
6 These rules can be found in several legal documents: see below, sec-
tion I.  
842 F. Bouhon 
Secondly, the choice of countries is also motivated by the fact 
that these legal and political systems are different on some impor-
tant points relating to elections, which builds a basis for compari-
sons in the studied field. For example, UK law organises the ‘first-
past-the-post’ system in small constituencies, whilst German and 
Belgian law have opted for differing types of proportional systems. 
The study summarised here uses a comprehensive definition of 
election law in order to try to tackle the electoral process as a 
whole7. This approach differs from other analyses in the literature8.  
From the perspective of substantive law, three categories of elec-
toral legal rules have been distinguished. The first group includes 
rules determining who can take part (actively or passively) in the 
electoral process. The legal conditions to be fulfilled by anyone 
who wishes to belong to the electorate or to become eligible as 
                                                             
7 The original work also has a historical perspective that cannot be fully 
reflected in this short article. Not only is there an analysis of current elec-
tion law, but also its evolution from the 19th century until the present. The 
beginning of the 1830’s saw huge political changes in Belgium and the 
United Kingdom; the Belgian Constitution came into force in 1831 and the 
First Reform Act was adopted in the following year. This Act is therefore 
used as a time-reference for the delimitation of the study framework. In 
the case of Germany, the Federal Republic was built more recently (1948) 
than the other studied states. However, elections had already been organ-
ised for a long period before the adoption of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz); 
accordingly, the political ancestors of the Bundesrepublik - the Kingdom 
of Prussia (Königreich Preußen), the German Empire (Deutsches Reich), 
the Weimar Republic (Weimarer Republik) and the Third Reich (Drittes 
Reich) - have been taken into consideration. 
8 Some other interesting studies do not cover such a large definition and 
focus on more specific aspects (see not. H.-C. JÜLICH, Chancengleichheit 
der Parteien. Zur Grenze staatlichen Handelns gegenüber den politischen 
Parteien nach dem Grundgesetz, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1967; W. 
BAUSBACK, Verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen des Wahlrechts zum Deut-
schen Bundestag, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 1998; A. KISSLINGER, Das Recht 
auf politische Chancengleichheit, [PhD dissertation, University of Jena, 
1998], Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998; M. WILD, Die Gleichheit der Wahl. 
Dogmengeschichtliche und systematische Darstellung, Berlin, Duncker 
and Humblot, 2003). 
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member of an assembly are relevant in this respect. The laws regu-
lating the selection and presentation of candidates have been classi-
fied in the same category. The second group of electoral legislation 
covers the formation and expression of opinion by the participants. 
The period preceding the vote, which includes issues such as media 
access during the campaign and the (public and private) funding of 
political parties is the focus of attention here. Procedures which 
help guarantee the free and sincere expression of opinion, such as 
the secret ballot, are of great importance as well. The third and final 
group of rules constituting the definition of election law includes 
those which transform the opinions expressed by votes into the dis-
tribution of parliamentary seats among parties and candidates. In 
this group we find the laws stating electoral formula, determining 
other modalities such as electoral thresholds, and managing the 
delicate question of the geographical distribution of seats (including 
the adaptation of constituency boundaries). In other words, the elec-
tion law gives answers to three very large questions: Who can par-
ticipate in the electoral process? How is the development and ex-
pression of political opinions regulated? How are these opinions 
transformed into the distribution of parliamentary seats?  
The definition of election law on which the analysis is based is 
also extensive from the perspective of procedural law. The study 
notes that the relevant rules can be issued by state authorities in 
several legal forms. Most are contained in legislative instruments 
and are partly codified in Belgium and Germany9. Executive power 
has a limited role in this field but can nonetheless complete the 
rules on several points. In both Belgium and Germany, some im-
portant electoral questions are directly ruled by the relevant formal 
constitutions10; there is no equivalent in British law for the United 
                                                             
9 This is notably the case for the Federal Election Act (Bundeswahlge-
setz) in Germany and the Election Code (Code électoral) in Belgium. The 
relevant UK law is scattered in many documents among which the most 
important is the Representation of the People Act 1983 (1983 c. 2). 
10 See in particular Art. 38 and 39 of the German Basic Law as well as 
Art. 61 to 65 of the Belgian Constitution. 
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Kingdom has no formal constitution11. However, state election law 
is also complemented by non-state legal orders, namely the political 
parties. Through their internal constitutions or rule books, they in-
fluence the electoral process on some decisive aspects, especially 
on the selection of candidates. Political parties have been rightly re-
garded as “the flesh and blood which give life to the skeleton of the 
State”12. By taking into consideration the relevant election rules 
adopted by the main German, Belgian and British parties, the study 
aims at offering a more complete analysis and a legal examination 
of the whole electoral process. To this aim, previous and current 
constitutions as well as rule books of the main German, Belgian and 
British political parties have been collected, with the help of spe-
cialised university libraries and the parties’ archive centres in the 
three relevant countries13. 
One of the main goals of the study was to discover legal justifi-
cations to explain the electoral inequalities subsisting in Belgium, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, and to then evaluate their com-
patibility with the standards of democracy. In this respect, some 
forms of justification have been identified in the case law of the 
highest national courts, such as the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the Belgian Constitutional Court 
(Cour constitutionnelle) and the Supreme Court for the United King-
dom. While important aspects of the relevant decisions of these na-
tional courts will be dealt with here, this article emphasises the 
standards set by the European Court of Human Rights, as they have 
a legal value not only for the studied countries but beyond them as 
                                                             
11 See V. BOGDANOR, The new British Constitution, Oxford, Hart, 2009, 
8. 
12 D. BEATTY, Political Parties and Constitutional Institutions, in: T. 
FLEINER (ed.), Five decades of Constitutionalism - Reality and Perspec-
tives, Basel, Geneva and Munich, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1999, 294. 
Similar comparisons have been suggested by many authors, including 
Walter Bagehot who wrote that political parties are “the vital principle of 
representative government” (W. BAGEHOT, The English Constitution, 
[1867], Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 107). 
13 It is possible to access some elements of this collection through the 
following Internet link: http://hdl.handle.net/2268/171092. 
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well. In particular, all decisions and judgments of the Strasbourg 
Commission and Court related to Article 3 of the First Protocol to 
the ECHR (right to free elections)14 have been meticulously exam-
ined in order to identify legal justifications for electoral inequalities 
and to sketch the limits of admissible inequalities in the election 
field15. The results of this analysis thus form one of the main points 
of interest of this paper. 
II. ELECTION LAW AND EQUALITY:  
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE 
Even if the definition of democracy is disputed and dependent on 
cultural and historical factors16, it is largely admitted that in such re-
gimes political power should as far as possible be equally shared 
among the governed people. According to Hans Kelsen, “[t]he es-
sence of the political phenomenon designated by the term [‘democ-
racy’] was the participation of the governed in the government”17. 
This fundamental idea was included in the preamble of the draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe through a quotation of 
the Athenian politician and historian Thucydides: “Our Constitution 
                                                             
14 According to this article: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under condi-
tions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature”. 
15 Moreover, some decisions based on Articles 10 [freedom of speech] 
or 11 [freedom of association] of the ECHR have also been taken into 
account. For example, this is the case for decisions regarding the access to 
the media during election campaigns (Art. 10) and the internal organisa-
tion of political parties (Art. 11).  
16 See G. BURDEAU, Démocratie, Encyclopaedia universalis, Paris, 
Encyclopaedia universalis, 1996, vol. 7, 151-156, especially 151; J. VAN 
NIEUWENHOVE, Parlement en democratie, in: M. ADAMS / P. POPELIER 
(ed.), Recht en democratie. De democratische verbeelding in het recht, 
Anvers, Intersentia, 2004, 149-178, especially 150. 
17 H. KELSEN, Foundations of democracy, Ethics, 1955, 1-101, espe-
cially 2. 
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(…) is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a 
minority but of the greatest number”18.  
Election law has a decisive influence on the way this power is 
distributed in practice19. As suggested in the title of this article, the 
study analyses election law through the prism of the principle of 
equality. The idea of equality is a fundamental concept in contem-
porary democracies20. On this issue, John Stuart Mill wrote that 
“[t]he pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the 
government of the whole people by the whole people, equally rep-
resented”21. But achieving true equality is a challenge, because it is 
only reached when everyone in a community finds himself on ex-
actly the same level. According to Ronald Dworkin, a system only 
offers equality in the repartition of resources when it “distributes or 
                                                             
18 History of the Peloponnesian War, 5th century B.C., vol. 2, chap. 37. 
19 It does not aim at organising the distribution of all state power - 
which is the role of constitutional law - but of an important part of that 
power: it regulates the selection of the representatives who are responsible 
for debating public affairs and adopting the law. On this topic, see G. 
JELLINEK, L’Etat moderne et son droit, Paris, Giard et Brière, 1913, 
2nd part, 257; K. POPPER, Zur Theorie der Demokratie, Der Spiegel, 1987, 
n° 32, 54-55, here 54. 
20 Since the 18th century, several authors have dealt with this concept. 
Among them: MONTESQUIEU, De l’Esprit des Lois, 1748, 1st part, book 5, 
chap. 3; A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, De la démocratie en Amérique, 1835 and 
1840, [new edition, Paris, Flammarion, 2008], 11; H. KELSEN, La démo-
cratie. Sa nature - Sa valeur, Paris, Sirey, 1932, 2; G. BURDEAU, Traité de 
science politique. Tome V: Les régimes politiques, 3rd edition, Paris, 
L.G.D.J., 1985, 514; R. DAHL, Democracy and its critics, New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press, 1989, 86; PH. GÉRARD, Droit et démo-
cratie. Réflexions sur la légitimité du droit dans la société démocratique, 
Brussels, Publications des Facultés universitaires de Saint-Louis Bruxelles, 
1995, 112; J. ROWBOTTOM, Democracy distorted. Wealth, Influence and 
Democratic Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 1;  
E.-W. BÖCKENFÖRDE, Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip, in: J. ISENSEE / 
P. KIRCHHOF (ed.), Handbuch des Staatsrecht, 3rd edition, Munich, Beck, 
2004, 429-495, here 457. 
21 J. S. MILL, Considerations on representative government, 1861, chap-
ter 7. 
 Can Electoral Inequalities Be Legally Justified? 847 
 
transfers so that no further transfer would leave their shares of the 
total resources more equal”22. Applied in the context of elections, 
this pure conception of equality would imply that every single 
member of the governed people would have the exact same influ-
ence on the election results as every other. If such a conception of 
equality had been used as a reference for the research, it would have 
led to conclude that almost every election rule has the potential to 
introduce inequality into electoral influence, because it deviates at 
least slightly from this ideal. A different approach has therefore 
been favoured: instead of using the absolute criteria of ‘pure’ equal-
ity, the study is based on tendencies. It appears that some legal rules 
tend to distribute the faculty to influence the composition of elected 
assemblies equally, while others tend to distribute it unequally.  
To evaluate the distribution of electoral influence in Belgium, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, it was first necessary to con-
sider who should be allowed to participate in a democratic electoral 
process. In other words, it was required to define the boundaries of 
the community to which political influence should be legally 
granted23. From a quantitative point of view, equality in the democ-
ratic process would be reached if each person submitted to the rules 
of a legal system would be allowed to choose the representatives 
who are responsible for dispensing the relevant law (all-subjected 
                                                             
22 R. DWORKIN, What is equality? Part I: equality of welfare, Philoso-
phy & Public Affairs, 1981, 185-246, especially 186. 
23 The problem of the theoretical limits of the electorate in democratic 
systems is an important question of political philosophy. This topic has 
been discussed by F. WHELAN, Prologue: Democratic theory and the 
boundary problem, in: J. PENNOCK / J. CHAPMAN (ed.), Liberal democ-
racy, New York and London, New York University Press, 1983, 13-47;  
G. BURDEAU, Traité de science politique. Tome V: Les régimes politiques, 
3rd edition, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1985, 120-121; R. DAHL, Democracy and its 
critics, New Haven, Yale UP, 1989, 193; R. GOODIN, Enfranchising all 
affected interests, and its alternatives, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
2007, 40-68, especially 40; H. BRIGHOUSE / M. FLEURBAEY, Democracy 
and proportionality, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2008, 1-19, espe-
cially 3. See also references in the next footnote.  
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principle)24. These people constitute the demos25. After examining 
German, Belgian and British law, it has been possible to conclude 
that the persons submitted to the legislations passed by a national 
assembly are mainly those with lasting residence within the national 
territory26.  
The power distributed among them is what we called the electoral 
influence, i.e. the ability to influence the composition of the assem-
bly through the electoral process27. Some of the demos members 
have no influence at all because they can neither elect nor be 
elected28. Although other members (in contemporary democracy, 
the majority of the demos) are allowed to participate, it is still use-
ful to observe how the influence is shared between them. This 
                                                             
24 See C. LÓPEZ-GUERRA, Should expatriates vote?, Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 2005, 216-234, here 220; L. BECKMAN, The frontiers of de-
mocracy. The right to vote and its limits, Houndmills Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 50-52; S. NÄSSTRÖM, The challenge of the all-
affected principle, Political Studies, 2011, 116-134, here 118-122. 
25 This word is often used in the literature mentioned in the previous 
footnotes.  
26 The word “mainly” is operative here. There are indeed, in the studied 
countries, legal rules which have an extraterritorial effect and cover people 
who live abroad; but the total analysis - which is impossible to reproduce 
in this short article - shows that national legal rules (for example in civil, 
criminal or tax law) mainly cover people living within the national terri-
tory.  
27 The concept of electoral influence is not equivalent to the notion of 
‘voting power’ which is used in the literature, notably by mathematicians 
and political scientists (see L. PENROSE, The elementary statistics of ma-
jority voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1946, 53-57; L. 
SHAPLEY / M. SHUBIK, A method for evaluating the distribution of power 
in a committee system, American Political Science Review, 1954, 787-
792; J. BANZHAF, Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis, 
Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 317-343; D. RAE, Decision rules and individ-
ual values in constitutional choice, American Political Science Review, 
1969, 40-56; J. COLEMAN, Control of collectivities and the power of a col-
lectivity to act, in: B. LIEBERMANN (ed.), Social Choice, New York, 
Gordon & Breach, 1971, 269-300). 
28 See below, III. 
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means that the distribution of electoral influence can be evaluated 
from both quantitative and qualitative angles.  
Having these general reflections in mind, it is now required to ex-
plore the actual distribution of electoral influence in the three cho-
sen legal orders, considering first election law with a tendency to 
equal distribution (III), and then law with a tendency to unequal 
distribution (IV). 
III. RULES WITH A TENDENCY TO EQUAL DISTRIBUTION 
This part of the article considers the rules which overall favour a 
high level of equality (if not necessarily the highest - it is a question 
of tendency29) among the governed people. Having considered the 
evolution of election law from the 1830’s until the present, it ap-
pears that a high level of equality is reached in Germany, in 
Belgium and in the United Kingdom. This can be observed in sev-
eral aspects, the most significant of which are briefly presented 
here, using a structure based on the three categories of election 
rules identified above30.  
a. Participation 
Regarding the question of participation, the large majority of the 
demos can now vote and stand as a candidate for general elections. 
This has become a reality thanks to the development of universal 
suffrage. Presently, the attribution of the franchise is no longer 
based on gender or socio-economic criteria, as had been the case 
until World War I and in some aspects until the middle of the 20th 
century. The main exceptions concern people who have not reached 
the requisite age (18 years old31) and foreigners. Nationality is a 
                                                             
29 See above, II. 
30 See above, I. 
31 For Germany, see § 12 (1) of the Bundeswahlgesetz; for Belgium, see 
Art. 61 (1) of the Constitution and Art. 1, § 1, 2°, of the Code électoral; 
for the United Kingdom, see section 1 (1) (d) of the Representation of the 
People Act 1983. In Germany, there is an interesting debate about the 
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condition for entering the electorate in the three studied states. Ger-
man Basic Law does not expressly exclude foreigners, but the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court ruled that inclusion in the ‘political people’ 
of the Federal Republic (Staatsvolk der Bundesrepublik) follows 
from nationality (Staatsangehörigkeit)32. Moreover, this is the prin-
ciple adopted by German legislation in the Bundeswahlgesetz33. In 
Belgium, the exclusion of foreigners from the electorate legally 
rests on several texts of the Constitution34 and is confirmed in the 
Election Code35. In this regard, UK law is more inclusive: not only 
British citizens can take part in the vote, but also Commonwealth 
citizens and citizens of the Republic of Ireland36 who live in the 
United Kingdom.  
The other causes of exclusion are based on more individual con-
siderations (due to mental incapacity or criminal conviction) and 
tend to be exceptional in contemporary democracies. The general 
exclusion of convicted prisoners remains however a topic of politi-
cal discussion in the United Kingdom: the Representation of the 
People Act 1983 states that during the time a convicted person is 
detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his sentence, he is le-
                                                             
extension of the right to vote to children (Familienwahlrecht). Children 
would be included in the electorate but their right would be exercised by 
their parents or legal representatives until their majority. In theory, this 
would offer a better correspondence between the demos and the electorate 
thanks to the extension of the last. But in practice, it would establish a 
form of plural vote that seems to be incompatible with modern standards 
of democracy. On this question, see K. LÖW, Das Selbstverständnis des 
Grundgesetzes und wirklich allgemeine Wahlen, Politische Studien, 1974, 
19; K. NOPPER, Minderjährigenwahlrecht - Hirngespinst oder verfas-
sungsrechtliches Gebot in einer grundlegend gewandelten Gesselschaft?, 
PhD dissertation, Tübingen, 1999; H. QUINTERN, Das Familienwahlrecht. 
Ein Beitrag zur verfassungsrechtlichen Diskussion, [PhD dissertation, 
Cologne, 2009], Berlin, Lit, 2010. 
32 BVerfG, 31 October 1990, BVerfGE, 83, 37 (51).  
33 § 12, al. 1. 
34 Art. 8, al. 2; Art. 33, al. 1 and Art. 61. 
35 Art. 1, § 1, 1°.  
36 Section 1 (1) (c) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
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gally incapable of voting in any parliamentary (or local) govern-
ment election37. This exclusion from the electorate holds for all pris-
oners, regardless of the seriousness of their offence or length of 
their sentence. It is an automatic consequence of imprisonment 
which requires no judicial oversight. Despite the pressure of the 
ECtHR case law, that considers such automatic exclusions as in-
compatible with Art. 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention38, the 
UK parliament still maintains this rule.  
Regarding the composition of the electorate, it is worth mention-
ing the situation for expatriates. Since the end of the 20th century, 
some expatriates can take part in the vote despite living overseas. 
German and British law restrict this right to a certain period of time 
after emigration39, while the Belgian Election Code offers it indefi-
nitely40. This relatively new trend in election law does not represent 
democratic progress: it grants the same electoral influence to resi-
dents subject to national law as to expatriates who are largely be-
yond this law and do not belong to the demos. 
b. Opinion 
The tendency towards equality is also supported by the ability of 
electors to express their political opinions freely and sincerely, ow-
ing to fundamental principles guaranteed by the law and enforced in 
practice.  
This is assisted firstly by the relatively high frequency of elec-
tions: at any one time, an election can be expected within the next 
few years (the period between two national assembly elections be-
ing limited to four years in Germany41 and five years in Belgium42 
                                                             
37 Section 3 (1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
38 See below, section V. a. 
39 See § 12 (2) of the Bundeswahlgesetz and section 1 (3) (c) of the Rep-
resentation of the People Act 1983. 
40 Art. 1, § 1, 3°, of the Code électoral. 
41 When there is no dissolution of the Bundestag, the election must be 
held between 46 and 49 months after the previous one (Art. 49 of the 
Basic Law). 
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and the United Kingdom43). Authorities cannot deprive the people 
of the opportunity to vote44. They can, however, organise snap elec-
tions, which makes it harder to predict the next election date. In 
many parliamentary regimes, the executive or head of state tradi-
tionally has the prerogative to dissolve parliament and to hold an 
election before the end of a term. Such an instrument can offer a de-
cisive advantage to the incumbent government parties, which are 
able in these circumstances to choose a convenient date and to se-
cretly prepare their campaign; in this regard, the snap election in the 
UK has been compared to “a race in which the Prime Minister is 
allowed to approach it with his running shoes in one hand and his 
starting pistol in the other”45. In the three countries examined here, 
this prerogative is no longer a discretionary power46: it can only be 
exercised when some strict conditions are fulfilled47. Despite the 
existence of these limitations, it appears that governments are often 
able to find ways to dissolve the parliament when they really wish 
to. In Belgium, the political authorities activate the constitutional 
revision process - which requires the dissolution of the federal par-
liament and was originally designed as an exceptional procedure - 
every time they intend to organise elections48. In Germany, the 
                                                             
42 Art. 65 of the Constitution. 
43 Section 1 of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (2011 c. 14). 
44 In the studied countries, exceptional measures have been adopted in 
the context of both World Wars to extend the period between two elec-
tions. These special allowances cannot, however, be analysed in this short 
contribution. 
45 Lord Holme, in Hansard, HL, vol. 529, col. 245, 22 May 1991. 
46 Regarding the previous system, see not. E. FORSEY, The royal power 
of dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth, Toronto, 
Oxford University Press, 1943; R. BLACKBURN, The prerogative power of 
dissolution of Parliament: law, practice and reform, Public Law, 2009, 
766-789. 
47 See Art. 63 (4) and 68 of the German Basic Law; Art. 46 and 195 of 
the Belgian Constitution and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 for the 
United Kingdom. 
48 Since 1954, every federal election - with the exception of the 1985 
election - has been preceded by the publication of a declaration of consti-
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chancellor proposed a motion of confidence to the Bundestag on 
three occasions (1972, 1982 and 2005) with the hope of obtaining 
its rejection and, as a result, gaining the right to ask the federal 
President to dissolve the assembly49. This adds nuance to the other-
wise pro-equality trend observed in this field. 
Another important evolution regarding the sincerity of the vote is 
the development of the secret ballot. This is the most robust institu-
tion for limiting the ability of wealthy and powerful electors to put 
others under economic or social pressure in order to influence their 
votes. Public vote procedures were common in the studied countries 
until the end of the 19th century. In the United Kingdom, the proc-
ess was known under the expression “viva voce” and based on rules 
established in the 15th century: the electors met together and were 
invited to express their vote through a show of hands. If no clear 
trend was established, the electors were then called one by one and 
invited to publicly speak out the name of their favoured candidate50. 
This pernicious system was abolished by the Ballot Act 187251, 
which notably introduced pre-printed ballots and polling booths. In 
Germany, the public nature of the vote introduced what has been 
described as a situation of “Wahlterror”52. It was not until the start 
                                                             
tutional revision (the first act of the revision process according to Art. 195 
of the Constitution) which automatically triggers the dissolution of the fed-
eral assemblies.  
49 This is often considered as a misuse of Art. 68 of the Basic Law. M. 
Morlok wrote that these motions were “unechte und auflösungsgerichtete 
Vertauensfrage”, i.e. “artificial and dissolution-oriented motions of confi-
dence” (M. MORLOK, Staatsorganisationsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
2013, 329). According to V. Bogdanor, chancellors have manipulated the 
institutions (V. BOGDANOR, The coalition and the constitution, Oxford and 
Portland, Hart, 2011, 117).  
50 H. BUCHSTEIN, Öffentliche und geheime Stimmabgabe. Ein wahl-
rechtshistorische und ideengeschichtliche Studie, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
2000, 166. 
51 35 & 36, Victoria c. 33. 
52 In English: “election terror”. T. KÜHNE, Entwicklungstendenzen der 
preußischen Wahlkultur im Kaiserreich, in: G. RITTER (dir.), Wahlen und 
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of the 20th century that the secret ballot was efficiently established 
in Germany53. Whilst far from perfect, the Belgian system was bet-
ter on this subject in the 19th century, for election law had imposed 
the secret vote since 183154; the lack of concrete guarantees, how-
ever, permitted some abuses55. Presently, the secret nature of the 
vote is almost unanimously recognised as one of the main princi-
ples of democratic elections56 and is established as such by na-
tional57 and international law58. Its efficiency could, however, be 
impaired by modern electoral practices such as postal voting, which 
permits people to fill in their ballot outside the polling booth, where 
they could be exposed to external influences. This cannot be con-
sidered as a minor detail since a quarter of the German electorate 
                                                             
Wahlkämpfe in Deutschland. Von den Anfängen im 19. Jahrhundert bis 
zur Bundesrepublik, Dusseldorf, Droste, 1997, 131-167, here 147-148.  
53 M. ANDERSON, Practicing democracy: elections and political culture 
in imperial Germany, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, 55. 
54 Art. 25 of the loi électorale du 3 mars 1831 pour la formation de la 
Chambre des représentants et du Sénat (Bulletin officiel, 1831, n° 19). 
55 J. STENGERS, L’établissement de la représentation proportionnelle en 
Belgique, in: P. DELWIT / J.-M. DE WAELE (dir.), Le mode de scrutin fait-
il l’élection?, Brussels, éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2000, 129-
144, here 133; R. VAN EENO, De evolutie van de kieswetgeving in België 
van 1830 tot 1919, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 1979, 333-352, here 
337; J. GILISSEN, Le système représentatif en Belgique depuis 1790, 
Brussels, La renaissance du livre, 1958, 110. 
56 In fairness, some contemporary authors do contest (at least theoreti-
cally) the relevance of the secret vote as a democratic principle: G. 
BRENNAN / P. PETTIT, Unveiling the vote, British Journal of Political 
Science, 1990, 311-333; J.-P. SARTRE, Elections, piège à cons, Les temps 
modernes, 1973, 1099-1108, here 1100; H. KRÜGER, Allgemeine Staats-
lehre, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1966, 251.  
57 Art. 62 (3) of the Belgian Constitution; Art. 38 (1) of the German 
Basic Law; section 18 and following of the Annex 1 of the Representation 
of the People Act 1983. 
58 See, for example, Art. 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. 
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used this method in 201359, as did a fifth of British electors two 
years later60.  
c. Transformation 
The tendency to equal distribution is also apparent in the geo-
graphical redistribution of seats and the revision of constituency 
boundaries. Election systems with uninominal constituencies en-
counter unique issues in this matter: because the number of seats 
per constituency cannot be adapted in such cases, the only solution 
is the modification of constituency boundaries, which always leads 
to political difficulties. For a large part of the 19th century, the demo-
graphic differences among the constituencies were paramount in 
Germany61 and the United Kingdom62 as were inequalities between 
electors depending on their place of residence. In those countries, 
the legal situation has changed considerably in favour of more 
equality: the constituencies are now frequently reapportioned and 
the number of inhabitants or electors tends to be more or less the 
                                                             
59 See the Website of the Bundeswahlleiter: 
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/glossar/texte/Briefwahl.html (last con-
sulted on 24 December 2015). 
60 C. RALLINGS / M. THRASHER, The 2015 general election: aspects of 
participation and administration, Plymouth, Elections Centre (Plymouth 
University), 2015, 2. 
61 E. SCHANBACHER, Parlamentarische Wahlen und Wahlsystem in der 
Weimarer Republik. Wahlgesetzgebung und Wahlreform im Reich und in 
den Ländern, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1982; W. RIDDER, Die Einteilung der 
Parlamentswahlkreise und ihre Bedeutung für das Wahlrecht in rechtsver-
gleichender Sicht (Deutschland, Großbritannien, USA), Göttingen, Institut 
für Völkerrecht der Universität Göttingen, 1976; H. VON GERLACH, Die 
Geschichte des preußischen Wahlrechts, Berlin, die Hilfe, 1908, 24 and ff. 
62 On this topic, see S. LANG, Parliamentary Reform 1785-1928, 
London, Routledge, 1999; M. CHADWICK, The role of redistribution in the 
making of the Third Reform Act, The Historical Journal, 1976, 665-683; 
E. PORRITT, Barriers against democracy in the British electoral system, 
Political Science Quarterly, March 1911, 1-31. 
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same in each, even if differences are still legally admitted63. The in-
tervention of independent commissions which have to implement 
the legal rules impartially helps in the battle against gerrymandering 
and constitutes another factor promoting equality64. The Belgian 
election system has used plurinominal constituencies since 1831 
and has thus known fewer difficulties on this topic when compared 
to Germany and the United Kingdom65: when the demography 
evolves, rather than modifying constituency boundaries, one can 
simply adapt the number of seats allocated to each. Such a system is 
based on a mathematical formula and can work automatically66, 
which helps avoid political controversy.  
                                                             
63 In the United Kingdom, the electorate of any constituency shall be be-
tween 95 and 105% of the national average (section 2 of the schedule 2 of 
the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, as modified by the Parliamen-
tary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011). The margin of appre-
ciation is broader in Germany, where uninominal constituencies are used 
to elect half of the members of the Bundestag: the number of German in-
habitants living in every constituency have to remain between 85 and 
115% of the national average. However, greater differences (between 75 
and 125% of the national average) can be admitted if there is special jus-
tification (§ 3, (1), (3), of the Bundeswahlgesetz).  
64 In the United Kingdom, four Boundary Commissions are responsible 
for recommending new boundaries of constituencies for Westminster 
Parliament and other assemblies (regarding these commissions, see D. 
ROSSITER / R. JOHNSTON / C. PATTIE, The Boundary Commissions. Re-
drawing the UK’s map of Parliamentary constituencies, Manchester and 
New York, Manchester University Press, 2009). In Germany, this function 
is exercised by the Permanent Constituencies Commission (die ständige 
Wahlkreiskommission). 
65 In the original study we showed that even in this context there were 
some political tensions and legal controversies regarding the process and 
timing of changes to the geographical share of the seats.  
66 Art. 63 of the Constitution. 
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IV. RULES WITH A TENDENCY TO UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION  
Despite the developments described in the previous section, other 
rules that tend to distribute the electoral influence unequally have 
been found. These trends can also be observed in each of the three 
categories of the definition of election law suggested above, i.e. 
participation, opinion and transformation.  
a. Participation 
Whereas universal suffrage means the right to participate is 
widely shared on election day, within the limits already mentioned, 
this is not the case for the earlier, more discreet, but nevertheless 
fundamental process of candidate selection. In the countries under 
consideration (and in most contemporary democracies), the only 
candidates with a serious chance of being elected are those who 
have been selected by the established parties and fielded in a con-
stituency with enough voter support67. Theoretically, people can 
contest the election as an individual candidate or create a new party 
to compete with the traditional ones, but in practice this is very of-
ten futile. In other words: “[s]ome entry barriers (…) make it almost 
impossible to form another party, not to mention the tremendous 
cost of such a venture. In these cases, the real ability of the individ-
ual to participate and influence the party is within the party (…)”68. 
An author who studied selection processes in the UK in depth found 
that “candidate selection plays a vital role in the British system of 
government”69; this is without doubt extendable to other democra-
                                                             
67 This has been observed in the political science literature since the be-
ginning of the 20th century: R. MICHELS, Political Parties, London, Jarolds 
& Sons, 1915, 183-184; E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, Party Government, New 
York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1942, 64 and 100.  
68 Y. MERSEL, The dissolution of political parties: the problem of inter-
nal democracy, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2006, 84-
113, here 104. 
69 A. RANNEY, Pathways to Parliament. Candidate selection in Britain, 
Madison and Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin Press, 1965, 4.  
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cies including Belgium and Germany. However, it appears that se-
lection power is concentrated, in the case of most parties, in a rela-
tively small number of hands. This conclusion follows from an 
analysis of the relevant state law and a large number of party rule 
books.  
Belgian and British state law contain very few obligations re-
garding candidate selection70, meaning parties are largely free to or-
ganise their selection process in these countries: even systems con-
centrating the power to choose candidates into the hands of the sin-
gle national leader of the party are legally permitted. In Germany, 
however, the Basic Law states that the internal organisation of the 
parties “must conform to democratic principles”71. This obligation 
applies notably to the candidate selection process, as expressly con-
firmed in the Bundeswahlgesetz, which contains several texts di-
rectly related to this question72. Among the relevant legal rules, it is 
specified that a party’s candidates must be selected by one of the 
three following organs of the party: an assembly of all the party 
members living in the constituency (Mitgliederversammlung), an 
assembly of the delegates of these members specifically elected to 
select the candidates (besondere Vertreterversammlung) or a com-
mon assembly of the delegates of these members (allgemeine Ver-
treterversammlung)73.  
                                                             
70 Among the few existing limits, the Belgian law foresees that every 
list of candidates must include as many men as women and that the first 
two candidates on the top of the list must be of different genders 
(Art. 117bis of the Code électoral). In the United Kingdom there is no 
obligation under state law for gender parity, but the Sex Discrimination 
(Election Candidates) Amendment Act 2002 (2002 c. 2) allows parties to 
take internal measures to promote these candidacies and foster the election 
of women as members of Parliament. The Act of 2002 has been adopted in 
reaction to previous case law which considered some party practices fa-
vouring women candidates as illegal (Jepson and Dyas-Elliott v. The La-
bour Party and others, 1996 IRLR 116). 
71 Art. 21, (1), of the German Basic Law. 
72 See especially §§ 21 and 27 of the Bundeswahlgesetz. 
73 See §§ 21, (1), and 27, (5), of the Bundeswahlgesetz. On this topic see 
I. HONG, Verfassungsprobleme der innerparteilichen Kandidatenaufstel-
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An analysis of the relevant state law only provides a starting point 
for the study of this question, for access to the legislative bodies 
also depends significantly on parties’ internal rules for candidate 
selection: “[t]he party rules and procedures determine the process 
which all aspirants have to go through to become official nomi-
nees”74. It was thus necessary to explore what is sometimes de-
scribed as the ‘secret garden of politics’75, using a method inspired 
by the work of political scientists Reuven Hazan and Gideon 
Rahat76. Despite the diversity of selection procedures applied by 
major British, German and Belgian parties, and even counting the 
more inclusive selection processes77, the general trend is that the 
decisive power belongs to small groups of party committee mem-
bers. This conclusion applies to Germany as well, despite the speci-
ficities of its state law, for at least two reasons: firstly, the main 
parties often choose to give the selection power to delegate assem-
blies rather than to member assemblies78; secondly, although these 
assemblies have the remit of selecting candidates, it appears that 
decisive choices are in fact made in advance by leading committees, 
which preselect candidates and suggest their names to the relevant 
                                                             
lung für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin, Nomos, 2004; M. 
WERNER, Gesetzesrecht und Satzungsrecht bei der Kandidatenaufstellung 
politischer Parteien, Osnabrück, Universitätsverlag Osnabrück, 2010;  
S.-C. LENSKI, Parteiengesetz und Recht der Kandidatenaufstellung, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011. 
74 P. NORRIS, Introduction: theories of recruitment, in: P. NORRIS (dir.), 
Passages to power. Legislative recruitment in advanced democracies, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 1-14, here 12. 
75 M. GALLAGHER / M. MARSCH (ed.), Candidate selection in compara-
tive perspective. The secret garden of politics, London, Sage, 1988. 
76 R. HAZAN / G. RAHAT, Democracy within parties. Candidate selec-
tion methods and their political consequences, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010. 
77 For example, in some constituencies, the British Conservative Party 
allows all electors (even those who are not members of the party) to take 
part in the final step of the selection process. 
78 C. FONTAINE, Wahlsystem und Oligarchisierung in Deutschland, PhD 
dissertation, Hamburg, 2001, 57; R. HAZAN / G. RAHAT, op. cit., 44. 
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assemblies79. All this implies that eligible people who hope to ac-
cess parliament have to obtain the support of leaders or committee 
members of one of the main political parties to gain a serious 
chance of election success. This conclusion itself may not be sur-
prising - it is an application of the iron law of oligarchy identified 
by Robert Michels a century ago80 - but it is significant to underline 
that this is sustained by law.  
Moreover, there is another obstacle in the path towards the desig-
nation of a candidate: in each of the countries covered by the study, 
the would-be candidates must either obtain the support of a rela-
tively large number of electors if they are not already represented in 
the parliament (in Germany81 and in Belgium82) or pay a deposit 
which will be refunded only if they receive a certain amount of 
votes (in the United Kingdom83). These legal formalities tend to 
                                                             
79 C. FONTAINE, op. cit., 136. 
80 “The democratic external form which characterizes the life of political 
parties may readily veil from superficial observers the tendency towards 
aristocracy, or rather towards oligarchy, which is inherent in all party or-
ganization” (R. MICHELS, Political parties, 1915 [reedition: Kitchener, 
Batoche, 2001], 13). 
81 In Germany, parties which already have members elected in the Bun-
destag can put up candidates in uninominal constituencies and establish 
lists of candidates in the Länder level without having to collect any signa-
tures. Other parties can put up a candidate in a uninominal constituency if 
they obtain the signatures of 200 electors and can establish a list of candi-
dates in a Land with the support of up to 2,000 electors - the effective 
number depending on the Land. Finally, individual candidates or groups of 
electors that are not officially recognised as parties can only compete in 
uninominal constituencies (if they collect at least 200 signatures) and can-
not draw up lists at Länder level. See § 18, (1) and (2), § 20, (2) and (3), 
and § 27, (1), of the Bundeswahlgesetz.  
82 In Belgium, every list of candidates must be supported either by three 
members of the House of Representatives or by 200 to 500 electors, de-
pending on the number of inhabitants in the relevant constituency 
(Art. 116 of the Code électoral). 
83 A person shall not be validly nominated as a candidate unless the sum 
of £500 is deposited. The deposit shall be forfeited if, after the counting of 
the votes is completed, the candidate is found not to have polled more than 
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keep the smaller or newer parties out of the national legislative as-
semblies and to disenfranchise the electors who support them; they 
can be analysed as a subsidy given to established parties84. 
b. Opinion 
Inequalities among candidates, parties and their electors are par-
ticularly strong in the period preceding the election day, when po-
litical opinions are still in formation for a large part of the elector-
ate. Owing to their success in the previous election, incumbent par-
ties are given inherent advantages. This is particularly notable in 
two areas: rights to funds and access to audio-visual media during 
the political campaign.  
In Belgium and in the United Kingdom, public money is only al-
located to parties which have already won at least one seat in par-
liament85. Moreover, the Belgian system drastically limits the possi-
                                                             
one twentieth of the total number of votes polled by all the candidates 
(Rules 9 (1) and 53 (4) of the schedule 1 of the Representation of the 
People Act 1983).  
84 F. MEINEL, Chancengleichheit oder Kooptation? Der Zugang kleiner 
Parteien zur Bundestagswahl, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 2010, 67-
76, here 68. 
85 In Belgium, the main public financing system is only open to parties 
which have already at least one seat in the House of Representatives 
(Art. 15 of the loi du 4 juillet 1989 relative à la limitation et au contrôle 
des dépenses électorales engagées pour l’élection de la Chambre des re-
présentants, ainsi qu’au financement et à la comptabilité ouverte des par-
tis politiques). In the United Kingdom, the public financing of the parties 
is less developed than in Belgium and Germany. Some money is allocated 
in application of a system commonly called “Short money”, which is made 
available to the opposition parties that secured either at least two seats or 
one seat and more than 150,000 votes at the previous general election. It is 
based on a resolution of the House of Commons (HC Deb, 26th of May 
1999, vol. 332, col. 427-429). Another public subvention - the Policy De-
velopment Grant - is made available for all parties that have won at least 
two seats at the House of Commons in application of the section 12 of the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. 
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bility of private donation to parties, thus increasing the relative im-
portance of public funding to which only the established parties 
have access86. Financial inequality is less apparent in Germany, 
where any party that gains 0.5% of the national vote has a right to 
public money even if it does not obtain a seat in the Bundestag87. A 
peculiarity of the German financing system is that the amount of 
public money allocated to a party cannot exceed the amount of its 
own private revenue88; this prevents a party from depending solely 
on state finance. From a financial perspective, the main source of 
inequality in Germany is the absence of campaign spending limits 
that are important instruments in British89 and Belgian90 law. In 
these countries the expenses of the candidates individually and of 
the parties collectively have to comply with legal limits. In this re-
gard, it can be affirmed that “the spending limits assist by reducing 
the money available to spend, thereby containing the money which 
needs to be raised, thereby in turn relieving the parties of the need 
to seek larger and larger donations from more and more people”91. 
In the legal systems under scope, the law also favours the estab-
lished parties in terms of access to the most influential media, espe-
cially radio and television. It is beyond doubt that “[b]roadcasting is 
a scarce but influential resource; access to it is a correspondingly 
                                                             
86 Only Belgian natural persons can make donations and these are lim-
ited to €500 a year to a particular party; if a person wishes to donate 
money to several parties, the total amount of his or her transfers is limited 
to €2,000 a year (Art. 16bis, (2), of the loi du 4 juillet 1989 mentioned 
above).  
87 The right to receive public money is also open to parties which ob-
tained 0.5% of the vote in the European Parliament election or 1% of the 
vote in any Land Parliament election (§ 18, (4), of the Parteiengesetz).  
88 § 18, (5), of the Parteiengesetz. 
89 Section 76 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 and sec-
tion 72, (2), of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. 
90 Art. 2 to 14 of the loi du 4 juillet 1989 mentioned above.  
91 K. EWING, Promoting political equality: spending limits in British 
electoral law, Election Law Journal, 2003, 499-523, here 499. 
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valuable advantage”92. In this regard, the incumbent parties are once 
again privileged: they receive longer and more valuable airtime and 
can therefore deliver their political messages to a larger audience. 
This access takes the form of invitations to political debates, partici-
pation in radio or television reports, and the allocation of time for 
election broadcasts. Other parties can obtain limited airtime if they 
fulfil some further conditions, the most significant of which being 
putting up a sufficient number of candidates. German law seems to 
be more generous than Belgian and British law: it states that every 
political party which has put up a valid list of candidates can obtain 
at least one fifth of the broadcasting time that is allocated to the big-
gest parties of the Bundestag93. However, German and British case 
law does admit the broadcasting of election debates in which only 
the leaders of the (respectively) two or three main political parties 
are invited to take part94. This is notable in the case of the famous 
Kanzler-Duell, which is watched by a significant part of the Ger-
man electorate before each general election.  
One of the most controversial topics regarding access to audio-
visual media concerns paid-for political advertising. In all three 
studied countries, it is forbidden by law to pay for the broadcasting 
of election campaign spots95; a practice that is common in the 
United States and in some European countries is thus excluded. 
                                                             
92 A. BOYLE, Political broadcasting, fairness and administrative law, 
Public Law, 1986, 562-596, here 562.  
93 S.-C. LENSKI, op. cit., 68. The same principle was confirmed in in-
structions sent to private broadcasters before the federal election of Sep-
tember 2013 (Rechtliche Hinweise zu den Wahlsendezeiten für politische 
Parteien im bundesweit verbreiteten Privatfunk). 
94 See BVerfG, 30 August 2002, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 2002, 
2939-2940; Scottish National Party Petitioner, 2010, CSOH 56. 
95 For Germany, see § 7, (9), of the Staatsvertrag für Rundfunk und 
Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) of 31 August 1991, in the version 
modified by the Fünfzehnter Staatsvertrag zur Änderung rundfunkrechtli-
cher Staatsverträge (Fünfzehnter Rundfunkänderungsstaatsvertrag, 15-21 
December 2010). For Belgium, see Art. 5, § 1, 5°, of the loi du 4 juillet 
1989 mentioned above. For the United Kingdom, see sections 319 (2) (g) 
and 321 (2) and (3) of the Communications Act 2003. 
864 F. Bouhon 
This measure prevents the richer candidates or parties from using a 
powerful instrument that the poorer ones could not afford, and 
therefore favours equality in the electoral process96. However, this 
ban is a significant limit to the freedom of expression, since candi-
dates and parties cannot spend their money on expressing their po-
litical ideas as they wish97. A blanket interdiction could violate Ar-
ticle 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but only 
where parties or candidates have no alternative to reach the elector-
ate98. In a recent case, the Court considered that UK law was com-
patible with the Convention, since there were enough alternative 
methods available for parties and candidates to communicate their 
political views99. This remains doubtful in the case of smaller par-
ties, which have very few other ways to do so on a large scale.  
c. Transformation 
Electoral formulas and other rules relating to the voting system 
can also encourage the unequal distribution of political influence100. 
This is more obvious in countries such as the United Kingdom, 
                                                             
96 See for example T. LEWIS / P. CUMPER, Balancing freedom of politi-
cal expression against equality of political opportunity: the courts and the 
UK broadcasting ban on political advertising, Public Law, 2009, 89-111, 
here 91; I. KATSIREA, Judicial review of party broadcasts in Germany and 
the United Kingdom, Journal of Media Law, 2009, 269-287, here 277. 
97 This argument leads a British author to affirm the following: “Gener-
ally political speech is more fully protected than commercial speech, so if 
broadcasters are legally free to show advertisements for goods and ser-
vices, it is hard to see why they should not be able to show advertisements 
for political parties and pressure groups” (E. BARENDT, Broadcasting law. 
A comparative study, Oxford, Crarendon Press, 1995, 170). 
98 European Court of Human Rights (GC), Animal Defenders Interna-
tional v. United Kingdom, 22 April 2013. 
99 Idem. 
100 M. DUVERGER, Les partis politiques, 1st edition, Paris, Armand 
Colin, 1951, 236 and ff.; D. RAE, The political consequences of electoral 
laws, 2nd edition, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1971, 
3 and ff. 
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where the ‘first-past-the-post’ system is applied: only the most suc-
cessful candidate in each constituency is elected and the others are 
kept out of parliament even if they (or their party) are supported by 
a significant portion of the electorate101. The Liberal Democrats are 
chronic victims of this system102, as are other smaller parties103. In a 
referendum on 5 May 2011, the citizens of the United Kingdom 
quite decisively rejected an opportunity to replace this system with 
the ‘alternative vote’104, which would have brought more equality 
between the parties105. 
Even under the proportional systems organised in Germany and in 
Belgium, the law tends to distribute electoral influence unequally in 
three ways. Firstly, some electoral formulas (like the d’Hondt for-
                                                             
101 Regarding this system, see for example P. HAIN, Misproportional 
representation, Hants, Wildwood House, 1986; P. DUNLEAVY / H. 
MARGETTS, The impact of UK electoral system, Parliamentary Affairs, 
2005, 854-870; A. BLAIS (ed.), To keep or to change First past the post?, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008; V. BOGDANOR, The new British 
Constitution, Oxford and Portland, Hart, 2009. 
102 This table compares the share of votes to the share of seats of this 
party since 1983: 
 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 
Share of votes 26.0% 23.1% 18.3% 17.2% 18.8% 22.6% 23.0% 7.9% 
Share of seats 3.5% 4.1% 3.0% 7.0% 7.9% 9.6% 8.8% 1.2% 
Sources: C. RALLINGS / M. THRASHER, British electoral facts, London, 
Totalpolitics, 2009, 80; D. KAVANAGH / P. COWLEY, The British general 
election of 2010, Houndsmill, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 351. 
103 The Green Party, for example, secured only one of the 650 seats (i.e. 
0.15%) in 2010 and in 2015, although they polled respectively 0.9 and 
3.8% of the vote. Moreover, the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) won in 2015 only one seat with 12.7% of the vote. 
104 This referendum has been organised in application of the Parliamen-
tary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011. On a turnout of 42.2%, 
68% voted No and 32% voted Yes. 
105 D. SANDERS / H. CLARKE / M. STEWART / P. WHITELEY, Simulating 
the effect of the alternative vote in the 2010 UK general election, Parlia-
mentary Affairs, 2011, 5-23. 
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mula implemented in Belgium106) favour larger parties and discrimi-
nate against smaller ones. Secondly, access to parliament is some-
times reserved for parties able to meet a legal threshold (5% calcu-
lated independently in each constituency in Belgium107 or nation-
wide in Germany108). Thirdly, when there are few seats allocated to 
a constituency, as is for example the case in some Belgian constitu-
encies109, the need for a greater share of the votes means another 
form of threshold is created on the path to parliamentary representa-
tion110.  
In Germany, a particularity of the ‘mixed member proportional 
system’ previously gave rise to further distortions and inequalities 
that favoured the two biggest parties. The Bundeswahlgesetz stated 
that parties which have won more seats in uninominal constituen-
cies than they could secure under the proportional system could 
nevertheless keep these ‘overhang seats’ (Überhangmandate). This 
implied that some parties could obtain more seats than their share of 
the votes would normally allow and therefore become overrepre-
sented in the Bundestag. The Federal Constitutional Court allowed 
this situation for a long time, considering that it was a sustainable 
consequence of the election system chosen by the legislator111. The 
                                                             
106 Art. 167 of the Code électoral. 
107 Art. 165bis of the Code électoral. 
108 § 6, (3), of the Bundeswahlgesetz. 
109 There are only four seats available in the less populated constituency 
used for the federal general election (province of Luxembourg).  
110 D. RAE, op. cit., 119.  
111 BVerfG, 3 July 1957, BVerfGE 7, 63, here 74 and ff.; BVerfG, 
22 May 1963, BVerfGE 16, 130, here 139 and ff.; BVerfG, 24 November 
1988, BVerfGE 79, 169, here 171; BVerfG, 10 April 1997, BVerfGE 95, 
335, here 358. About this German particularity and the debates regarding 
its legality and opportunity, see not. H. NICOLAUS, Demokratie, Verhält-
niswahl & Überhangmandate. Eine Studie zum Wahlverfassungsrecht, 
Heidelberg, Manutius, 1995; H. JACOB, Überhangmandate und Gleichheit 
der Wahl. Ein Beitrag zur aktuellen Wahlrechtsdiskussion, Frankfurt am 
Main, Peter Lang, 1998; H. MEYER, Die Zukunft des Bundeswahlrechts, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2010. 
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Court has however recently reviewed its conclusion112 and the Bun-
deswahlgesetz has since been modified113: ‘overhang seats’ can still 
be allocated, but this will be compensated by giving additional seats 
to all parties in the Bundestag to ensure full proportionality114. 
V. AMBIGUOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ELECTORAL INEQUALITIES  
The study summarised here not only aims at observing the effects 
of election law in light of the principle of equality, but also tries to 
offer a critical legal analysis of three electoral systems, by consid-
ering whether inequalities - where they exist - can be legally justi-
fied in democratic systems. To this end, national and international 
case law has been studied in order to establish a list of the main le-
gal justifications for electoral inequalities. An overview of the re-
search results, emphasising the European Court of Human Rights’ 
relevant decisions and judgments, is offered below. 
a. Implementation of Fundamental Constitutional Choices 
The first legal justification rests on fundamental constitutional 
choices regarding the political regime organised in each particular 
state. The exclusion of foreigners living in the national territory is 
                                                             
112 BVerfG, 3 July 2008, BVerfGE 121, 266; BVerfG, 25 July 2012, 
BVerfGE 131, 316. 
113 Zweiundzwanzigstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Bundeswahlgesetzes, 
3 May 2013, Bundesgesetzblatt, 2013, I, 1082 and ff. 
114 See the new § 6 of the Bundeswahlgesetz. On this reform, see G. 
STROHMEIER, Kein perfektes Wahlsystem, aber ein guter Kompromiss - 
unter schwierigen Rahmenbedingungen, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 
2013, 144-161; J. BEHNKE, Das neue Wahlgesetz, sicherlich nicht das 
letzte, Recht und Politik, 2013, 1-10; N. DEHMEL / E. JESSE, Das neue 
Wahlgesetz zur Bundestagswahl 2013. Eine Reform der Reform der Re-
form ist unvermeidlich, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 2013, 201-213; 
H. HOLSTE, Demokratie wieder flott gemacht: das neue Sitzzuteilungs-
verfahren im Bundeswahlgesetz sichert das gleiche Wahlrecht, Neue Zeit-
schrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 2013, 529-534, here 532. 
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one of the clearest examples in this field: although they are sub-
jected to the law as much as citizens, they cannot participate in the 
election process, as Belgian, German and British constitutional law 
do not endow them with political power. This traditional approach, 
which favours nationality over residency, is admitted in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights case law115. However, choices regard-
ing the boundaries of the electorate are not always approved by the 
Strasbourg Court: measures that automatically exclude prisoners 
from the right to vote are for example held as violating Art. 3 of the 
First Protocol to the ECHR116. This case law is the origin of politi-
cal and legal controversy in the United Kingdom, as mentioned 
above.  
The choice of voting system, especially of the electoral formula, 
is another major political decision that democratic states are largely 
free to make as they see fit. Subject to possible constitutional obli-
gations, as in contemporary Belgium117, legislators can opt for any 
                                                             
115 See European Commission of Human Rights, decision Luksch v. 
Italy, 21 May 1997; European Court of Human Rights, decision Makuc v. 
Slovenia, 31 May 2007. 
116 ECtHR (GC), judgment Hirst v. the United Kingdom (2), 6 October 
2005. More recently, the Court held that member states could, however, 
exclude the whole of a category of prisoners, for example those who have 
been condemned for the more serious offences (ECtHR (GC), judgment 
Scoppola v. Italy (3), 22 May 2012, § 102 and ff.). The Court confirmed 
the incompatibility with Art. 3 of the First Protocol of disenfranchisement 
which “affects a group of people generally, automatically and indiscrimi-
nately, based solely on the fact that they are serving a prison sentence, ir-
respective of the length of the sentence and irrespective of the nature or 
seriousness of their offence and their individual circumstances” (ECtHR, 
judgment Brânduşe v. Romania (2), 27 October 2015, § 45). The Court of 
Justice of the European Union delivered recently a similar decision (CJUE 
(GC), judgment Delvigne v. Commune de Lespard-Médoc and Préfet de 
Gironde, 6 October 2015). The Court also stated that an individualised de-
cision must be made before excluding someone from the electorate on the 
grounds of mental incapacity (ECtHR, judgment Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, 
20 May 2010). 
117 Art. 62 (2) of the Belgian Constitution imposes the proportional sys-
tem for the election of the House of Representatives members.  
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voting system, even those which tend to keep political minorities 
out of parliament. The case law indisputably supports this position: 
“as regards, in particular, the choice of electoral system, the Court 
reiterates that the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appre-
ciation in this sphere. In that regard, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
goes no further than prescribing ‘free’ elections held at ‘reasonable 
intervals’, ‘by secret ballot’ and ‘under conditions which will ensure 
the free expression of the opinion of the people’. Subject to that res-
ervation, it does not create any ‘obligation to introduce a specific 
system’ such as proportional representation or majority voting with 
one or two ballots”118. In this field, the Strasbourg Court takes into 
account the diversity of political traditions and historical particu-
larities: “[t]here are numerous ways of organising and running elec-
toral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical de-
velopment, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe, 
which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democ-
ratic vision”119.  
b. Compliance with Human Rights 
The unequal distribution of electoral influence is also partly justi-
fied by the implementation of human rights: perfect electoral equal-
ity would necessitate a disproportionate infringement of personal 
freedoms, notably the two freedoms of expression and association.  
                                                             
118 ECtHR (GC), judgment Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. 
Greece, 15 March 2012, § 65. See also: ECHR, decision X. v. the United 
Kingdom, 6 October 1976; ECHR, decision Liberal Party v. the United 
Kingdom, 18 December 1980; ECHR, decision X v. Island, 8 December 
1981; ECtHR, judgment Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 54 
and ff.; ECtHR, decision Federación nationalista Canaria v. Spain, 7 June 
2001; ECtHR, judgment Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, 30 January, 2007, 
§ 61; ECtHR (GC), judgment Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, 8 July 2008, 
§ 110. 
119 ECtHR, judgment Communist Party of Russia v. Russia, 19 June 
2012, § 108. 
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Regarding freedom of expression, one can affirm that very low 
spending limits prevent candidates from fully exploiting their rights. 
In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has found that 
the setting of a limit on expenditure by unauthorised persons during 
the election period as low as £5 in pursuit of equality between can-
didates was a disproportionate restriction, incompatible with Art. 10 
of the ECHR120.  
Freedom of association limits the possibility of authorities influ-
encing candidate selection: parties are indeed free associations and, 
despite their specific functions in political systems, are protected 
from excessive interference. The inequality resulting from selection 
processes (from which most of the electors are excluded) is thus - at 
least partially - justified by the freedom of association enjoyed by 
party members. This liberty is, however, restricted in Germany by 
the Basic Law: parties must respect democratic principles in their 
own structures and cannot deprive their members of influence dur-
ing the candidate selection process (the final decisions must be made 
by assemblies of the members themselves or their delegates)121. The 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights on this specific 
topic is quite limited, but recognises that the freedom of political 
parties to organise their candidate selection processes is not abso-
lute122. 
                                                             
120 ECHR, judgment Bowman v. the United Kingdom, 19 February 
1998. 
121 See above, point IV.a. 
122 See ECHR, decision Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the 
Netherlands, 10 July 2012, especially §§ 66 to 79. This case concerns a 
party which states that women should not be allowed to stand for elected 
office in general representative bodies of the State on its own lists of can-
didates. The party complained under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Conven-
tion that Dutch authorities (especially the Supreme Court), in taking meas-
ures to force the party to admit women on its lists, deprived it and its in-
dividual members of their right to freedom of religion, their right to free-
dom of expression and their right to freedom of assembly and association. 
The Court found this application manifestly ill-founded.  
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c. Efficiency and Stability of the Institutions 
One of the most common legal justifications for the unequal dis-
tribution of electoral influence is the drive for efficiency and stabil-
ity in democratic institutions. According to John Stuart Mill, the 
form of a government “is negatively defective if it does not concen-
trate in the hands of the authorities power sufficient to fulfil the 
necessary offices of a government”123. In pursuit of a workable gov-
ernment, election law can influence the assembly composition to 
facilitate the formation of a parliamentary majority able to make 
political decisions and pass bills.  
A great many electoral rules which tend to keep smaller parties 
out of parliament124 are frequently justified in this way with consti-
tutional court approval125. This is for example the case for rules 
such as legal thresholds, considered by the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court as a reasonable means to help forming a Bundestag 
                                                             
123 J. S. MILL, Considerations on representative government, 1861, 
chapter 6. 
124 One can mention, among examples already described in this article, 
the obligation to submit hundreds of signatures of support for candidates, 
the limited access to audio-visual media enjoyed by smaller parties during 
the campaign or the public financing scheme oriented in favour of already-
represented parties. 
125 The following decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
are notably relevant: BVerfG, 5 April 1952, BVerfGE 1, 208, here 247; 
BVerfG, 1 August 1953, BVerfGE 3, 19, here 27; BVerfG, 23 January 
1957, BVerfGE 6, 84, here 92; BVerfG, 30 May 1962, BVerfGE 14, 121, 
here 136; BVerfG, 11 October 1972, BVerfGE 34, 81, here 92; BVerfG, 
22 May 1979, BVerfGE 51, 222, here 236; BVerfG, 29 September 1990, 
BVerfGE 82, 322, here 338; BVerfG, 10 April 1997, BVerfGE 95, 408, 
here 418; BVerfG, 9 November 2011, BVerfGE 129, 300, here 321. 
Regarding the Belgian Constitutional Court, see C.A., judgment 
n° 30/2003, 26 February 2003, B.22.6; C.A., judgment n° 73/2003, 
26 May 2003, B.19.6; C.A., judgment n° 22/2004, 4 February 2004, B.3; 
C.A., judgment n° 96/2004, 26 May 2004, B.9.4; C.A., judgment 
n° 103/2004, 9 June 2004, B.8.4; C.A., judgment n° 78/2005, 27 April 
2005, B.11.3; C.C., judgment n° 86/2012, 28 June 2012, B.6.3. 
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capable of exercising its constitutional functions126. The European 
Court of Human Rights considers that election law can “channel 
currents of thought so as to promote the emergence of a sufficiently 
clear and coherent political will”127. 
d. Struggle against Antidemocratic Movements 
A no less significant purpose that can legally justify some ine-
qualities is the struggle against antidemocratic movements in order 
to perpetuate the democratic regime. This goal is commonly associ-
ated with electoral thresholds, which unfortunately keep all smaller 
parties out of the parliament, whatever their ideology, and do not 
create an obstacle to larger antidemocratic parties. More specific 
                                                             
126 In fact, the Court uses several expressions to refer to this idea; 
“Handlungsfähigkeit” - ability to act (BVerfG, 5 April 1952, BVerfGE 1, 
208, here 247; BVerfG, 23 January 1957, BVerfGE 6, 84, here 98; 
BVerfG, 22 May 1979, BVerfGE 51, 222, here 236; BVerfG, 9 November 
2011, BVerfGE 129, 300, here 321); “Funktionsfähigkeit” - ability to 
exercise its functions (BVerfG, 5 April 1952, BVerfGE 1, 208, here 248; 
BVerfG, 23 January 1957, BVerfGE 6, 84, here 92; BVerfG, 23 January 
1957, BVerfGE 6, 104, here 115; BVerfG, 22 May 1979, BVerfGE 51, 
222, here 236; BVerfG, 29 September 1990, BVerfGE 82, 322, here 338; 
BVerfG, 10 April 1997, BVerfGE 95, 408, here 418; BVerfG, 9 November 
2011, BVerfGE 129, 300, here 321); “Arbeitsfähigkeit” - ability to work 
(BVerfG, 22 May 1979, BVerfGE 51, 222, here 247); and “Entschei-
dungsfähigkeit” - ability to decide (BVerfG, 29 September 1990, BVerfGE 
82, 322, here 338; BVerfG, 10 avril 1997, BVerfGE 95, 408, here 419). 
127 ECtHR (GC), judgment Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, 8 July 2008, 
§ 112. See also: ECtHR, judgment Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, 2 March 
1987, § 54; ECHR, decision Tête v. France, 9 December 1987; ECHR, 
decision Fournier v. France, 10 March 1988; ECHR, decision Tête v. 
France, 10 March 1988; ECtHR, decision Antonopoulos v. Greece, 
29 March 2001; ECtHR, decision Federación Nacionalista Canaria v. 
Spain, 7 June 2001; ECtHR, decision Tsimas v. Greece, 26 September 
2002; ECtHR (GC), judgment Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 13 February 2003, 
§ 99; ECtHR, decision Bompard v. France, 4 April 2006; ECtHR, judg-
ment Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, 30 January 2007, § 62; ECtHR, deci-
sion Partija Jaunie Demokrati v. Latvia, 29 November 2007. 
 Can Electoral Inequalities Be Legally Justified? 873 
 
measures intended to prevent those parties from entering the par-
liament are quite scarce and invite criticism because they discrimi-
nate against candidates or parties either on the grounds of the ide-
ology expressed in their manifestos or of the content of their 
speeches.  
In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
Convention “cannot deprive the authorities of a State in which an 
association, through its activities, jeopardises that State’s institu-
tions, of the right to protect those institutions. (…) In view of the 
very clear link between the Convention and democracy (…), no one 
must be authorised to rely on the Convention’s provisions in order 
to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society. 
Pluralism and democracy are based on a compromise that requires 
various concessions by individuals or groups of individuals, who 
must sometimes agree to limit some of the freedoms they enjoy in 
order to guarantee greater stability of the country as a whole”128.  
In Belgium, the possibility of temporarily depriving parties of 
their public subvention when they show clear hostility towards the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights129 has been approved (with some reservations) by the 
Constitutional Court130. Other measures directed against anti-
democratic parties include restricting access to audio-visual media. 
The Belgian Council of State allows public broadcasters to refuse to 
air election spots which are not themselves antidemocratic but 
which represent parties known as antidemocratic131. Meanwhile, in 
Germany and in the United Kingdom, the election spots cannot be 
excluded from broadcasting based on the reputation of the party; a 
                                                             
128 ECtHR (GC), judgment Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and others 
v. Turkey, 13 February 2003, §§ 96 and 99. 
129 Art. 15ter of the loi du 4 juillet 1989 mentioned above.  
130 C.A., judgment n° 10/2001, 7 February 2001; C.C., judgment 
n° 195/2009, 3 December 2009. 
131 C.E., judgment n° 80.787, 9 June 1999, Bastien v. RTBF; C.E., judg-
ment n° 171.094, 11 May 2007, Robert v. RTBF. 
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decision not to broadcast must be founded on arguments related to 
the content of the message in question132.  
It is also important to underline a distinctive feature of German 
law: under the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court is the 
only authority allowed to judge the unconstitutional nature of a 
party and to consequently deprive it of the legal advantages gener-
ally given to parties133. This means that as long as a party has not 
been named in such a decision of this Court, it must be treated ex-
actly as the other parties, even if it is commonly known to be an 
antidemocratic or unconstitutional movement. 
e. An Ambiguous Concept of Representativeness 
Finally, the trend to unequal distribution of electoral influence in 
election law can be explained in relation to the concept of repre-
sentativeness. The study shows that parties are expected to gain a 
significant portion of the people’s support: not only should the par-
liament (as a whole) or its members (as individuals) represent the 
governed people, but the parties themselves are expected to be suf-
ficiently representative of the people; meanwhile, parties which are 
not sufficiently representative can be kept out of the parliament, 
with individual candidates faring even worse134. This is evident in 
several aspects of national election law in Belgium, Germany and 
                                                             
132 Regarding Germany, see especially BVerfG, 14 February 1978, 
BVerfGE 47, 198, here 227; and also: BVerfG, 17 August 1956, BVerfGE 
5, 85, here 140; BVerfG, 3 September 1957, BVerfGE 7, 99, here 107. In 
the United Kingdom, the election spots must not offend good taste and de-
cency; see R (Pro Life) v. BBC, 2004, 1, Law Reports (Appeal Cases), 
185; R (Alan Craig) v. BBC, 2008, High Court of England and Wales 
(Admin.), 1369. On this topic, see not. I. KATSIREA, Judicial review of 
party broadcasts in Germany and the United Kingdom, Journal of Media 
Law, 2009, 269-287. 
133 Art. 21, (2), of the German Basic Law. 
134 The ECtHR “highlights the primordial role played by political par-
ties, the only bodies which can come to power and have the capacity to in-
fluence the whole national regime” (ECtHR, judgment Oran v. Turkey, 
15 April 2014, § 64). 
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the United Kingdom and is supported by the European Court of 
Human Rights case law. 
Many measures which induce a tendency to unequal distribution 
of electoral influence are justified on the grounds that they reserve 
access to the parliament to sufficiently representative parties. Such 
a conclusion has been upheld in cases regarding various rules, such 
as the payment of deposits to put up candidates135, the collection of 
signatures to support candidacies136 and the electoral thresholds137. 
The position of the Strasbourg Court is especially clear on the 
point of public financing of political parties in the case law. It is 
held that states can reserve public funds for parties with a certain 
level of electoral support. This is notable in the judgment Özgürlük: 
“the Court considers that the public funding of political parties on 
the basis of a system of equitable distribution requiring a minimum 
level of electoral support pursues the legitimate aim of enhancing 
democratic pluralism while preventing the excessive and dysfunc-
tional fragmentation of candidacies, thereby strengthening the ex-
pression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legisla-
ture”138. It is interesting to note that, in the French version of the 
judgment, the Court uses the expression “seuil de représentativité”, 
which can be translated as “threshold of representativeness”, instead 
of the words “minimum level of electoral support”. 
In February 2016, the European Court of Human Rights judged 
that the states in general cannot be held responsible for the disad-
                                                             
135 ECHR, decision Tête v. France, 9 December 1987; ECHR, decision 
Fournier v. France, 10 March 1988; ECHR, decision André v. France, 
18 October 1995; ECtHR, judgment Soukhovetski v. Ukraine, 28 March 
2006, § 73.  
136 ECtHR, judgment Ekoglasnost v. Bulgaria, 6 November 2012, § 64. 
137 ECHR, decision Magnano and Südtiroler Volkspartei v. Italie, 
15 April 1996; ECtHR, decision Partija Jaunie Demokrāti and Partija 
Mūsu Zeme v. Latvia, 29 November 2007; ECtHR (GC), judgment Yumak 
and Sadak v. Turkey, 8 July 2008, § 125. 
138 ECtHR, judgment Özgürlük ve Dayanişma Partisi v. Turkey, 10 May 
2012, § 42. See also ECHR, decision New Horizons and others v. Cyprus, 
10 September 1998. 
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vantages in the electoral process which result of the choice “of only 
representing the interests of a small part of the population”139.  
The resulting challenge thus consists in determining what is a suf-
ficiently representative (or significant) party, to which election law 
has developed two complementary solutions. Firstly, the represen-
tativeness of a particular party is measurable on the election day 
following the ballot count. This is an essential feature of a democ-
ratic election: “only the elector may judge the aptitude of a political 
party to access the Parliament; his decision can only be assessed on 
the grounds of the number of votes”140. The implementation of the 
electoral threshold can illustrate this idea: on the election night, 
only parties that have obtained at least the requisite number of votes 
are seen as sufficiently representative and earn the right to access 
parliament. The representativeness of a political party here depends 
directly on its electoral support. Secondly, the representativeness of 
a party is presumed during the period preceding the election based 
on several elements, the most important of which being the party 
score in the previous election. This solution is often applied during 
the electoral campaign: the degree of legal advantages given to a 
party (in media coverage or public financing) cannot be determined 
according to the people’s current will, for its expression through the 
election is yet to come. The representativeness of each party, and 
the extent of the advantages linked to it, are therefore calculated ac-
cording to diverse elements such as the number of actual candidates 
and the results of previous elections. This element plays a major 
part, so that the most successful parties in a general election are le-
gally favoured when they face the following one.  
A general overview of the election law also allows another con-
clusion regarding the concept of representativeness: in each of the 
                                                             
139 ECtHR, Judgment Partei die Friesen v. Germany, 28 January 2016, 
§ 40. 
140 “Allein der Wähler hat über die Parlamentswürdigkeit einer Partei 
zu entscheiden; seine Entscheidung ist nur stimmzahlenmäßig meßbar”. 
H.-C. JÜLICH, Chancengleichheit der Parteien. Zur Grenze staatlichen 
Handelns gegenüber den politischen Parteien nach dem Grundgesetz, 
Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1967, 109.  
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studied legal systems, the composition of parliament is the outcome 
of a combination of the electors’ will as expressed through the vote, 
and of the government’s will in determining how people should be 
represented. What the electorate wishes is, in this respect, partially 
presumed.  
f. Legal Justifications, or Pretexts for Keeping Power? 
It appears that the trend in favour of unequal distribution of influ-
ence that characterised a part of the election law is therefore justi-
fied by several legal grounds and more generally by the contempo-
rary conception of democratic representativeness. However, the 
same rules help to secure the ruling powers - namely, the parties al-
ready represented in parliament and their supporters - which cannot 
be justified as such. The Deputy Leader of the Labour Party 
Clement Attlee recognised as much in 1933 when he said the fol-
lowing in the House of Commons: “I find that all parties, possibly 
we ourselves, tend to adopt the electoral system which suits their 
political position in any country for the time being. Minority groups 
naturally ask for the system that suits them, and majority groups 
probably have a dangerous tendency to squeeze out minorities”141. 
Despite much progress towards a more equal political system 
over the last few centuries, election law still builds a fortress around 
the main political parties and their supporters in the electorate. 
Within the walls those parties fight frequently, like knights in me-
dieval tournaments, and do not need to fear the enemies who are 
held behind the ramparts and moats. This relatively stable situation 
is only disrupted in two rather rare cases: when one of the knights 
dies during a tournament or when a powerful enemy breaches the 
fortress walls.  
In practice, however, it is extremely difficult - if not impossible - 
to retain those electoral rules which are legally justified and to re-
peal those which unrightfully favour the powerful elite, because 
they are almost always the same. In other words, after having ana-
                                                             
141 C. ATTLEE, 6 December 1933, quoted in R. BLACKBURN, The elec-
toral system in Britain, London, Macmillan, 1995, 424. 
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lysed election law in detail, it seems impossible in most cases to se-
riously distinguish the legal justifications from the political pre-
texts.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Under contemporary election law, a very large majority of the 
people can participate freely and frequently in the choice of repre-
sentatives, and therefore influence the adoption of rules to which 
they are submitted. A part of the election law tends, however, to 
distribute the electoral influence, i.e. the capacity to influence the 
composition of parliament, unequally among them. A significant 
part of the rules which have this effect are legally justified, accord-
ing to the case law of the most senior national and European Courts. 
The composition of the national legislative assemblies depends on 
the electors’ choices - this being a necessary condition for democ-
racy - but is also partially determined by election law itself, and by 
the leaders of the main political parties, notably through their 
choices of candidates. While British, German and Belgian election 
law may organise quite different electoral schemes, they are char-
acterised by a similar historical evolution and all contribute to the 
political dynamic which has been described briefly in this paper and 
which is analysed more deeply in the original work summarised 
here. 
ABSTRACTS / RÉSUMÉS 
In light of the principle of equality, German, Belgian and British election 
law contain some legal rules that tend to distribute the faculty to influence 
the composition of the elected assemblies equally among the governed 
people, and others that tend to distribute it unequally. The inequality 
caused by the latter group may be to some extent legally justified by con-
cerns for the general interest, but also provides rulers with means that help 
them to remain in power, which is hardly justifiable from a legal perspec-
tive. In these legal systems, parties are expected to gain a significant por-
tion of the people’s support: not only should the parliament (as a whole) 
and its members (as individuals) represent the governed people, but the 
parties themselves are expected to be sufficiently representative of the 
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people in order to access the legislative assemblies. Notably, this thesis 
draws examples from the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, from which relevant decisions are mentioned here. 
 
Le droit électoral allemand, belge et britannique, examiné à travers le 
prisme du principe d’égalité, est constitué de deux catégories de normes 
dont la dynamique est opposée: certaines normes électorales tendent à dis-
tribuer égalitairement entre les gouvernés la faculté d’influencer la compo-
sition des assemblées élues, alors que d’autres tendent à distribuer inégali-
tairement cette faculté. L’effet inégalitaire des normes de la seconde caté-
gorie peut être dans une certaine mesure juridiquement justifié par des ob-
jectifs d’intérêt général, mais cet effet assure aussi aux gouvernants - d’une 
manière difficilement justifiable en droit - des moyens de faciliter leur 
maintien au pouvoir. Dans ces systèmes juridiques, les partis constituent 
des objets de représentation: ce n’est pas seulement le parlement en tant 
que tel ou ses membres individuels qui doivent représenter les gouvernés, 
on attend aussi des partis eux-mêmes qu’ils soient suffisamment représen-
tatifs pour accéder aux assemblées législatives. Cette thèse est notamment 
confortée par la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme, dont les décisions pertinentes sont évoquées ici. 
